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Editorial

Toward the Development of ASEAN Security Community (ASC):

Identifying the Key Factors

Agus Trihartono

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1. INTRODUCTION

In October 2003, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)¹ member countries² staged a considerable “experiment” of multilateral regional cooperation and made a historic step toward regional integration by signing the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, also known as the Bali Concord II. The Bali Concord II was the ASEAN leaders’ agreement to establish an ASEAN Community by 2020, now upgraded to 2015. The Bali Concord II consists of three pillars, namely: the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), the ASEAN Security Community (ASC), and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). These pillars strengthen each other to support ASEAN as a regional community.

Among the three pillars of the ASEAN Community, the ASEAN Security Community (ASC)³ has evoked both appeals and questions. While there has been much inquisitiveness regarding ASEAN’s decision to formulate the security community and its ramifications on framing and handling ASEAN security, the analyses on this issue were limited. This study attempts to fill that gap by offering an account of ASEAN’s decision to realize a security community.

This study will investigate major question: What are the key factors towards the development of the ASC?

2. PREVIOUS STUDIES

There have been previous studies explaining the road to the ASEAN Security Community. Such studies highlighted the importance of both “workable” norms as one of the independent variables to conducting a security community development (Acharya, 2001, Poeu, 2002; Kho, 2004, Colin, 2007)⁴ and ‘evolution of security cooperation’ as essential ingredients to ASC (Severino, 2004).⁵

Unlike those two previous approaches this study argues that ASEAN’s determination to establish a so-called security community is the product of interplay between the global strategic

environment, regional political dynamics, and ASEAN's individual members' strategies. Thus, to gain a comprehensive 'picture' of the ASC, we employ a "multi-level" approach.

In arguing this, this study considers the idea to develop the ASC as a reflection of global dynamics, since the Southeast Asia region is politically subordinated to global politics. This study clarifies how the end of the Cold War stimulated 'the end of ideological rivalries' in Southeast Asia. Not only was there a shift in the nature of inter-states relations from "ideological" to "pragmatic," but also, following the enlargement of ASEAN membership and the 'second wave' of democracy after the financial crises of 1997, democracy and human rights have become new "ideals" to be adopted by most ASEAN members. These issues have encouraged a widening of the definition of security from 'state-security' to a more comprehensive security which includes the agenda of protecting human rights and democratization.

Apart from the aforementioned global scope, this study looks at the regional scope. The security community idea reflects ASEAN's demands for handling contemporary security issues in the region. Following the financial crisis, the "War on Terrorism," and the spread of infectious diseases, ASEAN security cannot be considered merely in terms of traditional security which is determined by military balance. Rather, so-called non-traditional security (NTS)⁶ issues have become significant both in quantity and variety. The idea of the ASC was sounded strongly after the Asian financial crisis devastated the economies of several members. The idea came to the fore at a time when member states realized that the newly emerging regional challenges not only weakened ASEAN's standing internationally, but also eroded cooperation within the region. Thus, it is important to note that regional aspects have created new security challenges and they have motivated ASEAN leaders to establish the ASC.

Finally, my study looks at the influence of individual members toward the ASC. As it is known that the idea of a security community came from Indonesia, the biggest member, Indonesia's factor on framing the security community cannot be disregarded. An investigation of the primary factors of Indonesia and other members' interactions regarding the ASC initiative is significant in understanding the 'real politics' behind the development of the ASC.

Throughout this study, we would like to examine how the interplay of three layers -- namely, global strategic environment, regional dynamics, and individual states' motives -- have reinforced toward the development of the ASC. By adopting this 'alternative' perspective we argue that an examination of these three layers will provides a more solid understanding of the rationales behind the creation of ASC.

3. THE RATIONALES

The concept of so-called ASEAN Security Community offered new approach to achieve security in ASEAN countries. So far the Bangkok Declaration (1967) was the basic line in approaching security issues of ASEAN members which attached security development on matter of common interests in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields,⁷ not in a security path. The concept of ASC clearly offers a new lane to reach a security community named: ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action 2004, known also as part of the Vientiane Action Program (VAP).⁸ Accordingly, in the context of ASEAN cooperation ASC has represented not only new pattern in achieving the regional security, but also it indeed indicates a somewhat shifting 'paradigm' in approaching security from 'non-political path to security'⁹ to be more direct one: a security path to security. Moreover, according to Security Community Plan of Action 2004 ASEAN came up with a clear call for realizing a security community in a certain time.

In regard to the shifting 'paradigm' in approaching security, the idea of ASC is considered the most unequivocal security framework among ASEAN member of the entire of ASEAN existence. Compared to previous ASEAN's security frameworks, such as the Bangkok Declaration 1967 which had kept away from stating security issues explicitly in its cooperation agenda, as well as evade stipulating the word 'security' in the declaration, ASC states political and security cooperation explicitly and clearly underscores security matters.¹⁰

ASC's idea in its most basic is in line with general concept of a security community in what Deutsch (1978) had been identified as conscious the existence of a fundamental, unambiguous and long-term convergence of interests among the actors in the avoidance of war in the conduct of

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intramural relations¹¹ or as Yalem (1979) had pointed out as group (of states) that has renounced the use of force as a means of resolving intra-regional conflicts and the absence of war.¹² ASC is conducted in the same purposes since ASC expresses ASEAN's commitment to peacefully handle security issues among ASEAN members.¹³ It is a new regional mechanism to answer problems of intra ASEAN which potentially threaten regional stability and to face new dimension of security.¹⁴

Furthermore, in contrast to security communities in Europe and North America and also to the previous ASEAN's security frameworks in which they emphasized mostly traditional security issues in their business, ASC embraces a comprehensive security.¹⁵ It includes both traditional and non-traditional security (NTS). However, ASC is neither a defense pact, military alliance¹⁶ nor a really security community in the way we understood as those in Europe and North America,¹⁷ since ASC pays attention not only to state security, but also include aspects of economic-led security, health-led security, terrorism, piracy, drug and human trafficking, and other trans-national issues. In short, ASC pays attention to Non Traditional Security (NTS).¹⁸ In line with the coverage of security issues, ASC is considered as wider than those both have remained in other security communities and the previous of ASEAN's frameworks. ASC also does not apply military aspect as core element as those has remained at Security Community in Deutsch's perspective.¹⁹

As a security community, ASC is not about avoiding conflict and to make war impossible *per se*.²⁰ ASC also promotes norms setting through ASC Plan of Action's 'political development'. Norm-setting is really important because both ASEAN members are various in political outlooks and ASC was set up in initial process to a regional integration, not a product of regional integration as those were in other security community frameworks. Therefore, in the creation of a security community would also inevitably require more than convergent common interests, but a common values.

In line with the need of common values, ASC has subscribed to the notion of sharing norms and values regarding to democracy and human rights. It means that ASC stimulates all member countries to believe democratic processes will both promote regional peace and stability and agree to aspire to; and even make it as the goal of ASEAN. Indeed, through ASC, democracy and human right has been included to be the novelty matter of ASEAN security.

3.1. Adaptation to the Changing Global Politics

Toward the development of ASC was not shaped in a 'vacuum space.' It was influenced by dynamics of both the internal and external regional environments. One significant aspect of the external environment is global politics as Weatherbee²¹ have pointed out that Southeast Asian security is only one dimension and a sub-system of global politics.

This section clarifies global politics particularly the end of the Cold War has stimulated the nature of contemporary ASEAN security, and therefore, the creation of the ASC. In the context of ASEAN, the end of the Cold War not only has greatly reduced the significance of ideology in super power rivalries, but has also modified the nature of inter-states relations to be more practical and realistic, enabled ASEAN to create frameworks of regional security more suitable to regional needs, and made possible ASEAN to expand its membership to encompass states whose ideologies are different. Furthermore, the end of the Cold War has also raised democracy and human right as new global issues.

Accordingly, following ASEAN's expansion of membership the discourse and the matters on democracy and human rights came to the surface and penetrated the content of ASEAN security concept. This development can be traced back to the following sources: First, Southeast Asia could not remain isolated from the fundamental transformations caused by the global trend of 'third wave democratization' of the late 1980s. This not only influenced more people to live in democracy than ever before, enhancing human dignity, but also established democracy as 'global ideology' which many countries were willing to incorporate into their political systems.²²

Then, as a consequence of membership expansion and the aftermath of the financial crisis of mid-1997 issues of democracy and human rights became more central to ASEAN discourse. As for the former, democracy and human rights issues penetrated the ASEAN security dynamic following the political crisis in Myanmar when the government arrested opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Due to the violations of democracy and human rights in Myanmar, ASEAN faces a tricky situation since the issue has constrained ASEAN's relationship with the rest of the world, and since the rest ASEAN members want to see progress toward political reconciliation in Myanmar.²³

Moreover, the aftermath of financial crisis of mid-1997 has stimulated democratic movements in ASEAN's core members: Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. The 'wave of democracy' in this period was considered part of the 'second wave of democratization' which swept East Asia, following the first wave in 1986-1992 which saw the establishment or reestablishment of constitutional democratic processes in the Philippines and Thailand.²⁴ Democratic movements not only have catalyzed the downfalls of some regimes (i.e. Soeharto in Indonesia and Chaivalit Yongchaiudh in Thailand), but also have improved the democratic political systems of certain members. Subsequently, democracy has become a 'passionate' issue in ASEAN dynamics.

In regards to idea of creating the ASC, subscribing concept democracy and human right have not only colored debate, but also have become critical to achieving an ASEAN Community. The preparatory meeting to the Bali summit in 2003 was a fine example of how democracy and human rights became hot issues in discourse. ASEAN members divided into opposing sides in incorporating the idea of democracy into the ASC. Even stipulating the word 'democracy' within ASEAN's goals raised pros and cons since a concept of regional security based on democracy would have implications on Brunei, which is a sultanate, Myanmar, which is ruled by a military junta, and communist Vietnam and Laos. On the other hand, the remaining ASEAN members supported retaining the word 'democratic' since promoting democracy would be a major step forward for ASEAN cooperation.²⁵ ASEAN finally adopted democracy and human rights as important elements of the ASC. In short, the issues of democracy and human right have intentionally and unintentionally 'pressured' ASEAN to adopt democracy and promoting human right as part of expanded security concept that adapted by ASEAN members.

3.2. The ASC: Responding Regional Dynamics

3.2.1. Facing ASEAN's New Security Challenges

Since the concept of ASC includes both traditional and non-traditional security (NTS) and in within a decade ASEAN witnessed the escalating variety of security challenges as aftermath of financial crisis and war on terrorism which has to be addressed, then the development of ASC to

respond ASEAN new security challenges namely NTS issues is not only important but also vital for the following reasons:

First, after financial crisis and 9-11 terrorist attacks issue on maritime piracy has been also becoming one of prominent concerns of ASEAN. Unlike other region which poses the decrease number of piracy, Southeast Asia region, particularly Malacca Strait and Indonesian water, the trend and the number of issues awake. According to Piracy and Ship Robbery Annual Report 2006,²⁶ the numbers of reported piracy have been increasing since 1994 and growing up in numbers after 1996. As the reportedly, piracy has not only raised threatened Southeast Asia security but also create the potential threat posed that aimed at hub port and merchant shipping.²⁷

Second, infectious diseases issues have been threatening ahead and stimulated another crisis in the region. SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) has increasing the mortality rate in ASEAN members and has led to regional economic loss. H5N1 virus of Avian Influenza has been also insisted on local preparedness and response since it has not only threatened animals but also human being. Also, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in East and Southeast Asia region rise dramatically, since WHO reported that one quarter of estimated 40 million total number people living with HIV/AIDS live in this region.²⁸ In short, infectious diseases obviously have become a real threat of human security in the region.

Third, after financial crisis ASEAN witnessed the increasing of migrant workers problems since some countries deported illegal foreign workers back to countries of origin,²⁹ bilateral tensions occurred among ASEAN' sending countries and recipient countries. Moreover, the working forces deportation was considered as, to some extent violated Human Right issues, as Amnesty International Release.³⁰ The strain increase the nationalistic sentiments in the grass-root level as we can see between Indonesia and Malaysia which counter-productive to ASEAN unity.

Given the facts mentioned above, according to the Bali Concord II the ASC is designed to comprehensively overcome such issues to counter “terrorism, drug trafficking, trafficking in persons and other trans-national crimes”; ASEAN member countries emphasized cooperation to resolve maritime issues and other trans-boundary aspects that will threaten security of region (Article 5).

In line with argument that ASC is ASEAN instrument in handling so-called NTS, Ralf Emmers, researcher from IDSS Singapore has also accentuated that ASEAN would be fail in running

the mission if ASEAN discussion on security give less focus on security issues in domestic domain of its members rather than inter states security (state security).³¹ Coherent with Emmers, Amitav Acharya, pointed out that ASC is a platform for collective action against trans-national challenges that affect security and well-being of its members.³² The IDSS circle's arguments is in line with report from Institute for South East Asia Studies (ISEAS) about "ASEAN Community Roundtable" held in Singapore on 4-5 June 2004 stated that to face NTS issues ASEAN need to go beyond the traditional security named "external threats given the new generation of trans-national security challenges as impacts of financial crisis, international terrorism, environmental pollution and the spread of infectious diseases".³³ Thus, one of factors of the development of ASC is ASEAN's device to face NTS issues.

3.2.2. Improving ASEAN Credibility

Until financial crisis 1997, ASEAN was seen organization with many achievements. ASEAN has been also frequently cited as a fine example of regionalism outside European Union and the most shining organization among the developing countries.³⁴ Since ASEAN was successfully in handling Cambodia issue during the Cold War and become an ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) core element to manage the change regional post Cold War, ASEAN achieved regional and international recognition as important regional player. Dewi Fortuna, in her paper acknowledged that ASEAN had important regional role as "it is no longer to talk about Southeast Asia without reference to this Association".³⁵

However, following the region was swept by financial crisis in 1997 the role and also the credibility of ASEAN has been under skepticism. The way how ASEAN dealt with financial crisis and its aftermaths have brought the Association to the lowest level of its credibility. The crisis aggravated ASEAN achievement and become one of serious challenge to the Association as a regional player. As Hadi Soesastro stated that ASEAN has lost its *pamor* (credibility) since ASEAN role has decreased during and after financial crisis.³⁶ Accordingly, the political events which rigorously stamped out ASEAN credibility are as follows:

First, ASEAN offered inadequate response to support members facing financial crisis even failure to deal effectively with its consequences was the core of most trenchant criticism the Association. A long with the aftermath of crisis, Shaun Narine, an Assistant Professor of Political

Science at St. Thomas University, Canada, saw ASEAN was unable to influence measures in any meaningful way and simply ‘fell apart’.³⁷ In addition, Makmur Keliat, professor of the University of Indonesia, highlighted that “ASEAN, as an institution was fail since the association did not have any capacity in handling Asian crisis”, as well as ASEAN performance in supporting member’s which experienced economic crisis could be considered as very incredible. These factors have reduced ASEAN credibility significantly.³⁸

Second, ASEAN was futile as it paid less attention to the most complicated situation to ASEAN’s foundation following the economic crisis: the violence in East Timor in 1999 was other aspect demised ASEAN standing. ASEAN and came under severe criticisms for their powerlessness to stem the violence and gross violations of human rights happened in East Timor.

Third, following the financial crisis 1997 ASEAN was unsuccessful to be key player in handling problems of transcends national boundaries. Facing the issues such as haze, terrorism, piracy and so on mostly has become more individual than collective concerns of ASEAN. In other word, ASEAN function in handling the issues was very limited. Even, the impacts of Asian financial crisis have been considered as the most challenge to ASEAN unity. Unlike the earlier ‘crisis’ such as Indo-China conflict and Cambodia issues which had brought ASEAN’s members more cohesive, financial crisis and terrorism issue made members of ASEAN in reverse. Even cohesiveness among ASEAN member because of economic crisis has been questionable. Paul Dibb, academic from Australia National University, pointed out the economic crisis made the Association more distracted, inward looking, and less solid. As results, long standing rivalries within ASEAN surfaced and threatened.³⁹

Furthermore, since domestic issues become most priority of ASEAN attention, state-centric behaviors rose up, and took place in ASEAN inter-states relations. Goh Coh Tong, the former PM of Singapore, supported the argument by stated “indeed impact of the crisis has been a much weakened ASEAN due to member states’ preoccupation with their respective internal affairs”.⁴⁰ Also, ASEAN leaders have been more statement to criticize each other opened in public rather than utilized ‘quiet diplomacy’ than ever before.⁴¹ According to Amitav Acharya, senior expert from the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies (IDSS), Singapore, the key intra-mural relationships has been strained by economic crisis of 1997 and latent territorial and political conflicts emerged into the concrete.⁴²

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Fourth, ASEAN mechanism of disputes settlement was not only unconvincing, but also indeed did not work to handle disputes among members since ASEAN members preferred third party (International Court of justice, ICJ) to solve their problems instead of using ASEAN norms and mechanism as instrument of problem-solving among members.⁴³ In the cases of the Indonesia-Malaysia conflicts over *Sipadan* and *Ligitan* Islands and Malaysia-Singapore dispute over White Rock Island, were not success examples to utilize ASEAN's norms and mechanism in handling territorial disputes among ASEAN states.

Finally, since ASEAN members become more inward looking because of crisis, and affected countries totally absorbed their energies in their domestic matters rather than resolving regional or trans-national boundaries issues, led to premise that members of ASEAN and ASEAN itself do not have inadequate capacity to respond security issues internally.⁴⁴ As result, ASEAN position as a driving force in running ARF mission⁴⁵ has been also criticized. This situation was ironic since ASEAN's functions best when it had an external focus to its activities, but less ability to address internal problems.

In line with the demise of ASEAN standing the idea to develop the ASC was designed to improve credibility of ASEAN. Many ASEAN observers come to the same conclusion since ASC created such a credible mechanism to handle security issues of its members. In line with the arguments, first, to develop the ASC is a clear effort to advance ASEAN credibility. Borrowing Bantarto Bandoro's argument, researcher of Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta, the idea behind the ASC is "to reformulate relations within ASEAN and most importantly to give a boost to ASEAN as organization since a wide array of differences and more complex intra security problems have emerged as impacts of the economic crisis in 1997."⁴⁶ And also Hadi Soesatro, executive director of the Jakarta based - CSIS, pointed out that ASC will be a regional order based on a set of rules of good conduct and a set of region wide mechanisms for conflict resolution will enhance ASEAN *pamor*.⁴⁷ In other word, ASC is ASEAN's effort to an institutional improvement.

Also, a part of credibility building the development of ASC can be seen as ASEAN efforts to wake up from stagnancy since its member's energies for the most part absorbed by the crisis and its aftermaths. A long with this argument, Carolina G. Hernandez, head of the Philippines Institute for

Strategic and Development Studies, Manila, pointed out that since ASEAN had been stagnant, ASC is a conscious idea both to make ASEAN bounce back from its stagnancy and to strengthen ASEAN identity and credibility.⁴⁸ In addition, borrowing Hadi Soesastro's argument, the ASC is an elemental change of the way to develop ASEAN.⁴⁹ Indeed, ASC was in line with improving both ASEAN credibility and its internal capacity.

In short, at the time ASEAN is still grappling with its relevance since problems mentioned above, the effort to develop ASC is part of ASEAN to look ahead to reliability.

3. 2. 3. Creating a Security Roadmap

Other important aspect behind the idea of ASC development is ASEAN's need for a security roadmap. In this sense, as consequences of shifting 'paradigm' as discussed earlier, ASC is purposed for a security roadmap. The following reasons at the rear of this rationale as follows:

First, although from the very early security was the primary matters of ASEAN cooperation, until currently ASEAN has not had a real security roadmap to guide intra ASEAN member to achieve security. The demand for a security roadmap is one of reasons to transform ASEAN to be a security community.⁵⁰ Admittedly, the idea of ASC is to provide members new meaning and new goal of political and security cooperation particularly to make clearer definition of ASEAN security, as well as to elaborate 'what' and 'how' are to achieve it as Rizal Sukma pointed out:

"ASEAN security can no longer be allowed to "float" without a sense of purpose; without a practical goal that needs to be achieved, without a future condition that needs to be realized. The idea of ASEAN Security Community is meant to provide such a sense of purpose, a practical goal, and a future condition that all member states should strive for."⁵¹

Next, a security roadmap became very significant since members' motives to knock ASEAN's door has been so varied. Moreover, ASEAN expansion which encompassed new members with various security predicaments, and also as the aftermath of economic crises, ASEAN security direction has been more complicated. Since the membership expansion was intended to embrace all the members as ASEAN 'family', ASEAN need to provide the clear path so that all members go to the

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same direction. In line with new ASEAN members, it is interesting to underscore the opinion of Tan Sri Noordin Sopiee, one of Malaysia's most respected intellectuals, stated that “the purpose of ASEAN is not to bring nice guys into the club. The purpose of ASEAN is to live at peace among ourselves”.⁵² In connection with Sopiee’s argument, a security roadmap is inevitable. In addition, Ralf Emmers stated that a security roadmap is vital since it provides both a clear direction and definite agenda for all members to concrete security cooperation. As a result, to develop ASC is important as it is “a way out after ASEAN in several years has lost its direction”.⁵³

Third, as ASC together with AEC and ASCC are pillars to ASEAN Community, they are both equal and mutually reinforced. Accordingly, a senior diplomat of Indonesia stated that since ASEAN economic success was not taken for granted; security has been contributed significantly to economic cooperation as both are two side of one coin.⁵⁴ Along with this statement, as ASC was seen as a security roadmap, it was designed to complement ‘economic roadmap’. The bottom line of interconnection between economy path and security path is the sustainability economic development. Since economy and security are not mutually exclusive, without a clear path of security development, it seems that the sustainability of economic development is also in doubt. In this sense, ASC is to complement ASEAN economic cooperation under the AEC. Most importantly, so far economic road map has been more developed than that of security. Thus, since ASEAN’s security road map lags behind that of economy, creating a security roadmap under ASC will make ASEAN development to be in ‘balance’.

3.3. The Indonesia Factor

As it is known that the idea of a security community came from Indonesia, the biggest member of ASEAN which was also the chair of ASEAN standing committee, the Indonesia factor cannot be disregarded. Instead, the Indonesia factor must be spotlighted as not only essential, but also inseparable from the ASC development.

ASEAN has been very important to Indonesian’s foreign policy from ASEAN’s early days. Indonesia was active in ASEAN establishment and has been involved in ASEAN activities since Soeharto, the second president of Indonesia saw that a peaceful and stable Southeast Asian

region was crucial to allowing the country to focus on domestic development. As the most important objectives of Suharto's foreign policy were to support Indonesia's economic development by mobilizing international resources and to make sure the regional environment provided a favorable atmosphere for Indonesia to focus on its domestic agendas, Indonesia's foreign policy could not overlook ASEAN or its members' relations. Thus, ASEAN has been considered Indonesia's cornerstone of foreign policy⁵⁵ and the primary part Indonesia's concentric circle formula.⁵⁶

Indonesia is one of the key initiators of ASEAN's establishment and has created many initiatives in ASEAN activities. Thus, many proposals came from Jakarta in regard to ASEAN development in general and political and security cooperation in particular. Many of those initiatives have become ASEAN frameworks for managing political and security relations both among members and extra-regional states, such as: ZOPFAN, TAC, SANWFZ, ARF, etc. As a result, Indonesia's role and support in ASEAN development has been generally acknowledged as an "important factor behind ASEAN's success."⁵⁷ Hence, aside from being by far the largest member in the Association in terms of population and size, Indonesia's long and substantial involvement in ASEAN has received other countries' recognition as a *primus inter pares* (the first among equal) state.⁵⁸

However, the financial crisis changed the focal point of Indonesia's foreign policy to ASEAN. As the success of economic development was at the heart of Suharto's legitimacy, the impact of the financial crisis on Indonesia de-legitimized the Suharto regime. Suharto's fall from power on 21 May 1998, decreased the degree of Indonesia's foreign policy attachment to the Association since Indonesia's attention and efforts were captivated by domestic problems economically and politically.

It was obvious that the financial crisis and the fall of Suharto caused Indonesia's long-stable approach to ASEAN to be shaken. Jakarta's reduced attention to ASEAN both due to domestic affairs in the era of Habibie and a different "orientation" of foreign affairs in the era of President Wahid which has diminished Indonesia's role and reputation in the Association.

The era of president Megawati (2001-2004) brought Indonesia's foreign policy "back to basics." One of the most important elements of Megawati's "back to basics" foreign policy could be identified in her speech at People Consultative Assembly (MPR) which reaffirmed that "Indonesia placed ASEAN as the first foreign policy priority."⁵⁹ By re-applying the "concentric circle formula," the Megawati administration has not only revised the orientation of Wahid's foreign policy, but also reaffirmed ASEAN as a cornerstone of Indonesian foreign policy. Accordingly, President Megawati's decision to introduce the idea of the ASEAN Security Community (ASC) symbolized Indonesia's new approach toward ASEAN.

3.3.1. Indonesia's Motivations on the Development of the ASC

For Indonesia, the idea of launching the ASC was based on the following rationales: reaffirmation of ASEAN's importance and conducting norms-setting, as the following:

3.3.1.1. Reaffirmation of ASEAN's Importance

One of the most obvious initiatives resulting from Indonesia's comeback to ASEAN dynamics was the idea of ASC. Indonesia launched the idea for the first time at the 36th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on 17 July 2003, and again broached the idea at the ASEAN Summit in Bali in October 2003. The Bali Concord II, comprising the AEC, the ASC, and the ASCC, was approved by the ASEAN leaders' agreement at the summit.

Indonesia's initiative to launch the ASEAN Security Community was in accordance with Jakarta's first priority approach to ASEAN. For Indonesia, the ASC not only reflected the "come-back" of Indonesia to ASEAN,⁶⁰ but also reaffirmed that ASEAN was one of Indonesia's most important concentric circles. As Dewi Fortuna stated:

"Indonesia would place higher priorities on regions closest to its own national boundaries, ... The first foreign policy circle is ASEAN, regarded as the cornerstone of Indonesia foreign policy for maintaining friendly relations with its immediate Southeast Asia neighbors is critical to Indonesia's own security, particularly in the border areas."⁶¹

In so doing, since economic crises 1997 had weakened Indonesia domestically and internationally, it was essential to prioritize relations with geographically proximate neighbors. Accordingly, ASEAN stability was important for Jakarta.

As the ASC was sounded by Indonesia, the biggest member, there have been speculations connecting reaffirmation of ASEAN's importance by Indonesia with real politic considerations, as a leadership motive. The following are 'interpretations' of Indonesia's motives in initiating the ASC:

First, the ASC is interpreted as Indonesia's effort to regain its leadership in ASEAN, since the economic crisis reduced Indonesia's capacity to be the first among equal members. The fundamental changes to political and economic development due to the crisis which hit Indonesia, not only diminished Indonesia's leadership within the organization, but also led to the loss of Jakarta's diplomatic centrality, which it had enjoyed throughout most of ASEAN's existence. The ASC has provided a chance for Indonesia to deal with this matter. This argument is based on at least two facts: Indonesia's position as chair of the ASEAN standing committee, which has advantages both for proposing and running initiatives;⁶² and the statements of Foreign Minister Wirajuda regarding the ASC as a sign of Indonesia's revival from the crisis. It seems likely that to some extent the ASC represents Indonesia's effort to take back its core position in ASEAN. This is in line with Foreign Minister Wirajuda's statements in an Indonesian newspaper on 4 October 2003 and his speech in Jakarta on 11 August 2006: "The Bali summit was a moment for Indonesia not only to chair the ASEAN standing committee but also to lead the Association."⁶³ This also coincides with the opinion of Carolina Hernandez, head of the Philippines Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, Manila, who underlined that the Bali summit was a reflection of Indonesia's desire both to restate its leadership and to revitalize the Association in which Jakarta took the lead initiative so that ASEAN can move again.⁶⁴ Also, according to one ASEAN senior diplomat, the leading role of Indonesia in the Association can be measured by its achievement in promoting the ASEAN Security Community "under Indonesia's chairmanship."⁶⁵ Last but not least, Rodolfo C. Severino, the former ASEAN Secretary General mentioned, in the context of the ASC

Indonesia regain to some extent the leadership role in ASEAN after Jakarta had lost its capacity to take charge.⁶⁶

Second, the ASC is seen as an Indonesian expression of the sense of “regional entitlement” to create initiatives, to set the direction for ASEAN, and as far as possible to contribute significantly to ASEAN development. Thus the ASEAN security community is an initiative to create new platform for ASEAN and a new clearer direction. This kind of initiative has been inherent in Indonesia’s involvement in the dynamics of ASEAN from the early days of its forming. In other words, the bottom line of Indonesia’s initiative toward the ASC is not only a matter of leadership itself, but of sustaining Indonesia’s traditional role which has always offered initiatives and contributions to ASEAN development. Indeed, it is part of an expression of regional entitlement by Indonesia.⁶⁷ This is in line with the argument that the ASC reflected Indonesia’s expression of “ideological leadership” more so than political leadership.⁶⁸

A third interpretation of Indonesia’s ASC initiative was that Indonesia had less ability to take a leading position in the economic field.⁶⁹ Although in political areas Indonesia has been more advanced, as the country has been successful as one of the biggest democracies in the world, Jakarta so far cannot provide leadership in economic areas. Although it is vital to have a leading position in economics since the financial crisis Jakarta did not have sufficient capacity or achievement in economic areas. Indeed, the ASC was mostly initiated because Indonesia had been vital in regional political and security areas, but not in economic ones. In other words, to some extent the ASC seems to be instrument of “division of labor”⁷⁰ of ASEAN members’ leadership in political and security arenas.

3.3.1.2. Creating Norms

Another element behind the idea of ASC was Indonesia’s initiative on so-called norms creation.⁷¹ Unlike all the previous ASEAN frameworks, such as the Bangkok Declaration of 1967, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ), which made no mention of the sharing of common values such as respecting human rights and

democracy, the ASEAN Security Community (2003) and the ASC Plan of Action (2004) have subscribed the notion of sharing those values. The ASC concept encompassed idea of 'political development,'⁷² referring to democracy and human rights values. By doing so, Indonesia hopes to upgrade the security relationship by forging security ties among the 10 diverse ASEAN countries based not just on interdependence, but also on democracy. The idea is to update ASEAN's political principles. In connection with this argument, Foreign Minister Wirajuda underscored that Indonesia would like to see a democratic ASEAN which respects Human Rights.⁷³ Moreover, democracy was seen as an essential ingredient to regional peace and stability, as one Indonesian senior diplomat stated: "If all ASEAN members are democracies, they won't wage war against each other."⁷⁴ This argument is in line with argument that in international relations democracies are usually less bellicose than dictatorships.⁷⁵

Along with this pro-active initiative, there were at least two other main elements which influenced Jakarta's idea for the ASC, namely, coherency with Indonesian domestic dynamics and preserving the unity of ASEAN by supporting creation of norms.

In regards to the former, coherency with Indonesian domestic dynamics, the ASC initiative was a reflection of Indonesia's domestic political dynamics, particularly related to main discourses on democracy and human rights. As foreign policy to some extent is an extension of domestic politics, an expression of domestic interests, or at least is neither dichotomized nor contradicted principally with the "soul" of domestic issues, the idea of ASC mirrored the needs of the domestic domain. It became possible as the decision-making process of Indonesia's foreign policy changed significantly in the post-Suharto era. In the decision-making process, on the one hand, the content of foreign affairs and the actors involved have not been exclusively the area of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but have included other political actors, such as parliament (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*, DPR), the press, and others dealing with foreign policy issues. On the other hand, Indonesia has been experiencing a putative "democratization" period. The diversification of actors and the democratization process have definitely caused the basic idea of democracy and human rights to become attached to Indonesia's foreign policy. For instance, Indonesia's position toward Myanmar over the Aung San Suu Kyi case, the response to the arrest of Anwar Ibrahim of

Malaysia, and the idea of the ASC's "political development," as well as it has been reflections of a domestic issue: Indonesia's democratic transition.⁷⁶

The latter, the idea that the ASC was concerned with preserving the unity of ASEAN, expressed the political will of Indonesia to maintain the unity of ASEAN without any essential division, economically or politically. This is based on arguments that in Jakarta's point of view, the financial crisis and ASEAN membership expansions have created some partitions among ASEAN members on both economic development and values. Simply put, ASEAN members have been divided economically into more developed, less developed, and under developed members; and politically into democratic, less democratic, and non-democratic ones.⁷⁷ The former reflects the partition of economic levels of development and local capacities, and the latter reflects the values gap among members. These divisions are clear, but have rarely been acknowledged.

The economic partitions have been obvious, while ASEAN leaders have remained politically committed to the vision of transforming ASEAN into an economically integrated grouping within a framework akin to the ultimate forms of economic integration, from ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) to the AEC.⁷⁸ Moreover, the gaps in economic development were exacerbated after idea of an ASEAN FTA with China, Japan, South Korea, and India was suggested. Conducting an FTA with the economic giants in Asia has spurred competition rather than cooperation among members, stirring potential friction or even conflict.⁷⁹ For Indonesia, these partitions were considered as disincentives and counter-productive elements in achieving an ASEAN community.⁸⁰ Accordingly, the idea of the ASC is an initiative to bridge gaps among members. The ASC offered a political development aspect which is a necessary aspect of ASEAN community building.⁸¹

Furthermore, a values gap has remained among ASEAN members. This gap stems from the lack of "common values" to underpin efforts to achieve an ASEAN community, since a community requires, at its most basic level more than just a common interest.⁸² Therefore, the ASEAN community needed a foundation driven by common values rather than mere geographical identity and common interests.

In fact, ASEAN members include countries with different cultures, political systems and outlooks, and countries which have opposite political systems, as well as one country led by an armed forces group which does not respect values and systems of democracy. Consequently, although the Association has produced numerous diplomatic products, those do not imply that ASEAN has come near to realizing a community. Thus, not only do the countries of ASEAN not share a common political system, but also to some extent they still regard each other as rivals and engage in diplomacy with mutual suspicion. Indeed, as long as the fault-lines between members who adopt more open political systems and more closed ones are real, it seems likely to be a long road to achieving a community.⁸³ In this regard, common values are inevitably necessary since ASEAN members need to communicate each other in the same “language.”

To sum up, promoting the idea of an ASC consisting of “political development”⁸⁴ is a necessary and, indeed, inevitable effort to fill the values gap. As Indonesia Foreign Minister Wirajuda emphasized: “It is undesirable to let too many disparities remain indefinitely among ASEAN members’ political development levels, as they will create friction and disputes among members. Therefore, Indonesia came up with the idea of political development which is inherently a part of the ASC.”⁸⁵

3.3.1.3. Issue of Political Acceptance

The Bali Concord II which consists of three pillars, namely: the AEC, the ASC, and the ASCC were accepted by all members as a new step toward regional integration. The process of acceptance by all members was not that simple. Simply, in regards to the ASC there were a set of bargaining and discussion. Simply put they were as the follows:

All ASEAN origin members (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines) accepted the idea of Indonesia’s ASC due to argument that the ASC reflected Indonesia’s expression of “ideological leadership” more so than political leadership which historically attached to Indonesia role in as a regional “entitlement”.⁸⁶

Secondly, in regards to ASEAN Community there has been a kind “trade-off” to diversify the leadership of ASEAN based on political, economy and socio-cultural. Leading

Indonesian scholars come to conclusion that following the financial crises the “leadership” of ASEAN has been spread out as seen on Bali Concord II as to some extent the ASC is indeed Indonesian’s project, the AEC is a project of Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, and the ASCC is the Philippines’s project since such countries are initiators of such ideas.⁸⁷

Finally, the ASEAN new comers, known as CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam) which are at much different levels of economic and political (democratic) development and than the older members mostly took such position to be more pragmatic. Since the motive to be ASEAN members are mostly the benefits of economic development, and the implementation of the idea of ASC would be gradual and flexible then the Indonesia’s ASC is something acceptable. Moreover, despite contention and suspicious among new members have been matters and unavoidable, for CLMV Indonesia to some extent is out of their circle of rivalries.⁸⁸

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The ASC are somewhat unique, since the ASC commits more to respond broad definition of security: NTS that put security on many dimensions of threats faced by states and other actors in regional dynamics. These include post financial crisis impacts, terrorism, and other new issues such as: migrant workers, ecological degradation, HIV/AIDS, drug trafficking and others.

Moreover, with regards to the various backgrounds of its members, politically, economically, and even in terms of strategic motives, the ASC functions as a ‘locomotive’ pulling all members to embrace ‘common values,’ as it encourages all members to identify democracy and human rights as their goals.

As the ASC is the outcome of three layers, global politics, regional dynamic and Indonesian factor, then the discussion throws light on the fact that the ASC is a consequence of multi-level ‘games’ and purposes.

¹ In this article, the terms of “ASEAN” and “the Association” are interchangeable.

² ASEAN member countries are: Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, The Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar.

³ The full document of ASC is available at URL: <http://www.aseansec.org/15160.htm>.

⁴ See Amitav Acharya (2001), *Constructing a Security Community in the Southeast Asia*, London and New York: Routledge, p 47-71. See also Amitav Acharya, ‘The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: ‘Security Community’ or ‘Defence Community’?’ *Pacific Affairs*, 64:2 (Summer 1991), pp.159-178; see also Alan Colins, *Forming a Security Community: Lesson from ASEAN*, *International Relations of Asia Pacific*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2007; Nicholas Khoo, *Deconstructing the ASEAN Security Community: a Review Essay*, *International Relations of the Asia Pacific*, Vol 4, 2004; Sorpong Peou, ‘Merit in Security Community Studies’, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 5, Number 2, 2005, pp. 267–274.

⁵ Ravoldo Severino, *Toward an ASEAN Security Community*, *Trend in Southeast Asia Series*, No. 8, 2004, p. 1-19.

⁶ Non Traditional Security (NTS) is an alternative approach to security studies which puts a broad definition on security. It sees that security cannot be only about the military dimension. There are many dimensions of threats faced by states and other actors in international relations. These include ecological degradation, HIV/AIDS, drug trafficking, ethnic conflict, illegal migration and others. See Ralf Emmers (2004), *Non Traditional Security in the Asia-Pacific: the Dynamic of Securitisation*, Eastern University Press, pp. 1-2.

⁷ These aspects are stipulated clearly in the Bangkok Declaration 1967.

⁸ For full document of ASC Plan of Action 2004, see appendix 2.

⁹ According to Sukma, the changes of the strategic environment, and its attendant implications for regional security and domestic priorities, make it imperative for ASEAN to also acknowledge the importance of “security road towards peace.” ASEAN can no longer pretend that “peace, stability, and prosperity” can only be achieved through economic cooperation. See Rizal Sukma (2003).

¹⁰ See article 1 of ASC of Bali Concord II: “The ASEAN Security Community is envisaged to bring ASEAN’s political and security cooperation to a higher plane to ensure that countries in the region live at peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment”.

¹¹ Karl Deutsch et. al (1978), *Political Community in the North Atlantic Area*, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, pp. 239-253.

¹² Quoted from Mely Caballero–Anthony, *Re-visiting Security Communities: ASEAN and Bali Concord II*, *IDSS Worling Paper*, Singapore, 2004.

¹³ Article 1: “The ASEAN Security Community members shall rely exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences and regard their security as fundamentally linked to one another and bound by geographic location, common vision and objectives”.

¹⁴ Faustinus Andrea, *Dokumen: Diplomasi Tingkat Tinggi Asia Pasifik: KTT ASEAN dan KTT APEC 2005* (Document of High Level Diplomacy in Asia Pacific: ASEAN Summit and APEC Summit 2005), *Analisis CSIS*, Vol. 34, No. 4, 2005, p. 436.

¹⁵ See article 2 of ASC: “taking into account the strong interconnections among political, economic and social realities, subscribes to the principle of comprehensive security as having broad political, economic, social and cultural aspects in consonance with the ASEAN Vision 2020 rather than to a defense pact, military alliance or a joint foreign policy.”

¹⁶ Indonesia Foreign Minister Hasan Wirajuda reaffirmed very clearly that ASC is not designed to be a military pact. See *Republika*, 23 July 2003: *RI: ASC Bukan Pakta Militer* (RI: ASC is not a Military Pact).

¹⁷ Deutsch’s works (1978) of security community referred to European, United States and North America experiences. Deutsch’s historically revealing the development in Europe in the 1950s when the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) was remained. The latter served as the foundation for the development of the European Economic Community which was a basis for the birth of security community. Deutsch’s offers two types of a security community: amalgamated security community and pluralistic security community. For further explanation of security community see Deutsch, Karl W, (1978), *The Analyses of International Relations* (2nd edition) (Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ) and see also Adler, Immanuel, and Barnett, Michael, (1998), *Security Communities*, Cambridge University Press.

¹⁸ See Ralf Emmers, (2004), *Non Traditional Security in the Asia-Pacific: the Dynamic of Securitisation*, Eastern University Press, p. 1-2.

¹⁹ According to Rizal Sukma, ASC does not apply military aspect as core element as those has remained at Security Community in Deutsch’s perspective. ASC is a security community which has been adjusted to ASEAN context, in which ASC still preserve element of TAC. ASC provides new meaning and new goal of ASEAN political and security cooperation. Author’s Interview, Jakarta, 14 December 2006.

²⁰ Rizal Sukma, *The Future of ASEAN: towards a Security Community*, paper presented at a Seminar on “ASEAN Cooperation: Challenges and Prospects in the Current international Situation”. New York, 3 June 2003.

²¹ Donald E Weatherbee (2005), *International Relations in Southeast Asia*, Rowman & Littlefield Publisher. Inc.

²² Clark. D. Neher and Rose Marlay, *Democracy and Development in Southeast Asia: The Winds of Change*, WestviewPress, 1995.

²³ Isagani de Castro, ASEAN: Can't We All Just Get Along? *Asia Times*, 7 October 2003.

- ²⁴ Walden Bello, Asia's Diverse Democratic Transition, in Kristina N. Gaerlan (ed) (1999), *Transition to Democracy in East and Southeast Asia*, Institute for popular Democracy, Quezon City, Philippines, p. viii.
- ²⁵ Isagani de Castro, *ibid.*
- ²⁶ Quoted from Noel M. Morada, *Regional Maritime Security Initiatives in the Asia and Pacific, Problem and Prospect for Maritime Security Cooperation*, paper presented in Berlin Conference on Asian Security, 14-15 November 2006.
- ²⁷ It was reported that piracy attacks in Indonesia's water have been remaining high from 22 cases in 1994 to 115 cases in 1999; In the Philippine water from 5 cases in 1994 to 39 cases in 1996; Malaysia, from 4 cases in 1994 to 18 cases in 1999; Singapore Straits from 3 cases in 1994 cases to 14 in 1999; Thailand from 4 cases in 1995 to 17 cases in 1997.
- ²⁸ Ilavenil Ramiah, "Securitizing the AIDS Issue in Asia", in Mely Caballero-Anthony, Ralf Emmers, and Amithav Acharya (2006), *Non-Traditional Security in Asia.: Dilemmas in Securitization*, Ashgate, England, p. 136-7.
- ²⁹ So far there are about more than 100.000 immigrant workers from Myanmar in Thailand; there are roughly 2 million foreign workers in Malaysia, both legal and illegal, who account for more than 5% of the country's population nearly a quarter of the workforce. It was more than 500.000 from Indonesia in Malaysia and more than 100.000 from the Philippine in Malaysia, Asnani Usman, in Bantarto Bandoro (ed) (1996), p. 171.
- ³⁰ Amnesty International press Release, *News Service No: 305*, 2 December 2004, available at: <<http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA280142004?open&of=ENG-MYS>>.
- ³¹ *Kompas*, 5 October 2003: "Peringatan Untuk KTT ke-9 di Bali: ASEAN Jago Retorika, Lemah Implementasi" (Notification of the 9th ASEAN Summit in Bali: ASEAN's Strong in Rhetoric, Weak in Implementation).
- ³² Amitav Acharya, "ASEAN Needs New Tools for New Threats", *The Straits Times*, 4 June 2003
- ³³ *ISEAS Report*: "Toward Realizing An ASEAN Community: A Brief Report On ASEAN Community Roundtable", ISEAS Singapore, 2004, p. 9-11.
- ³⁴ Peter Eng, 'Transforming ASEAN', *the Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No.1, 1999, p. 51; See also Michael Hass (1989), *The Asian Way to Peace: A Story of Regional Cooperation*, Praeger.
- ³⁵ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "Indonesia Role's in ASEAN", in Dewi Fortuna Anwar (2005), *Indonesia at Large: Collected Writing on ASEAN, Foreign Policy, Security and Democratisation*, The Habibie Center, Jakarta, p.2. and also see p. 18-9.
- ³⁶ Author's Interview with Hadi Soesastro, Jakarta, 14 December 2006.
- ³⁷ Narine argues persuasively that the crisis weakened ASEAN in three ways. It undermined the confidence, born of economic success, which was at the heart of ASEAN's assertiveness on the international stage; it accentuated the weakness of its claims to be a credible economic institution; and it underlined the dysfunctional of the "ASEAN Way", see Shaun Narine (2002), p. 167.
- ³⁸ Makmur Keliat also identifies the creating ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, and South Korea) mostly motivated by enhancing ASEAN image and capacity in the future. Makmur Keliat, "ASEAN 10 Tahun Mendatang" (ASEAN in the Next Ten Years), *Kompas*, 26 December 2006.
- ³⁹ Dibb, Paul, David. D. Hale, and Peter Prince, The Strategic Implications of Asia's Economic Crisis, *Survival* 40, No. 2, Summer 1998, p. 19.
- ⁴⁰ *Kompas*, 27 March 1999.
- ⁴¹ These could be identified in many cases such as those between Malaysia-the Philippines; Singapore and Malaysia; and Thailand and Malaysia on Spratly Island cases against China, Malaysia and Indonesia and Thailand and Malaysia controversy over the admission of new members (i.e. Cambodia and Myanmar), and the intra-mural differences that may have occurred during the period of crises was further heightened when one of ASEAN's members openly challenged the principle of non-interference Thailand's proposed flexible engagement, were among examples of problems of cohesiveness. See Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Baladas Ghoshal, (1999), p. 760.
- ⁴² Amitav Acharya, "ASEAN Needs New Tools for New Threats", *the Straits Times*, 4 June 2003.
- ⁴³ Shaun Narine (1997), p. 975.
- ⁴⁴ Shaun Narine (2002), p. 194.
- ⁴⁵ This in line with argument that as ARF's main objective are CBMs, Preventive diplomacy and conflict resolutions, ASEAN admittedly has lack experience in conducting the last two. Consequently, the demise of ASEAN's credibility in this forum has been unavoidable. Author's Interview with Rizal Sukma, Jakarta, 14 December 2006.
- ⁴⁶ Bantarto Bandoro, ASEAN's Collective Leadership, *The Jakarta Post*, 1 October 2003.
- ⁴⁷ Quoted from Isagani de Castro, ASEAN: Can't We All Just Get Along?, *Asia Times*, 7 October 2003.
- ⁴⁸ *Kompas*, 5 October 2003: "Peringatan Untuk KTT ke-9 di Bali: ASEAN Jago Retorika, Lemah Implementasi" (Notification of the 9th ASEAN Summit in Bali: ASEAN's Strong in Rhetoric, Weak in Implementation)
- ⁴⁹ Author's Interview, Jakarta, 14 December 2006.
- ⁵⁰ *ibid.*
- ⁵¹ Rizal Sukma, *the Future of ASEAN: towards a Security Community*, Paper presented at A Seminar on ASEAN Cooperation: Challenges and Prospects in the Current international Situation, New York, 3 June 2003.
- ⁵² Nathapong Thongpakde, "ASEAN Free Trade Area: Progress and Challenges", in Mya Than (2001), *ASEAN Beyond Regional Crisis: Challenges and Initiatives*, ISEAS, Singapore, p. 60.
- ⁵³ *ibid.*

- ⁵⁴ Confidential Author's Interview with a senior diplomat of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, Jakarta, 26 November 2006.
- ⁵⁵ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "Indonesian's Role in ASEAN", in *Indonesia at Large: Collected Writing on ASEAN, Foreign Policy, Security and Democratization*, (Jakarta: The Habibie Center, 2005), p. 4.
- ⁵⁶ This is a conceptual analysis of Indonesian foreign policy which gives weight to three spheres of influence: ASEAN, the Non-Aligned Movement and developing world, and the west. These three spheres of influences, to some extent, demonstrate Indonesia's desire for a regional and global role. See Anthony L. Smith, *Strategic Centrality Indonesia's Changing Role in ASEAN*, (Singapore. ISEAS, 2000), pp. 17-9.
- ⁵⁷ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "Indonesian's Role in ASEAN", in Dewi Fortuna Anwar (2005), p. 3.
- ⁵⁸ Nicholas Khoo, (2004), p. 36.
- ⁵⁹ *Suara Pembaharuan*, 23 September 2004: *Megawati Soal Kebijakan Luar Negeri RI: ASEAN Prioritas Utama*.
- ⁶⁰ Author's Interview with Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Jakarta, 1 December 2006.
- ⁶¹ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "Megawati's Search for an Effective Foreign Policy", in Dewi Fortuna Anwar (2005), p. 102.
- ⁶² Author's Interview with Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Jakarta, 1 December 2006.
- ⁶³ Translated by author. *Kompas* 4 October 2003: *Menu: Saatnya Indonesia Memimpin ASEAN* (Foreign Minister: It's Time for Indonesia to lead ASEAN). See also *Directorate of Information and Media, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Republic of Indonesia*, Transcripts of Keynote Speech of Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Nur Hasan Wirajuda on National Seminar on "Membangun Komunitas ASEAN yang Berpusatkan pada Masyarakat" (Building ASEAN Community Centered to People), Jakarta, 11 August 2006, at: <http://www.deplu.go.id/?hotnews_id=1261>.
- ⁶⁴ *Kompas*, 4 October 2003.
- ⁶⁵ *Isagani de Castro*, ASEAN: Can't We All Just Get Along?, *Asia Times*, 7 October 2003.
- ⁶⁶ Ravaldo Severino (2004), p. 2.
- ⁶⁷ Author's Interview with Rizal Sukma, Jakarta, 14 December 2006.
- ⁶⁸ Nanang Pamuji, "ASEAN Concord Kedua" (The Second ASEAN Concord), *Suara Pembaharuan*, 1 October 2003.
- ⁶⁹ Author's Interviews with Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Jakarta, 1 December 2006. and Hadi Soesastro, 14 December 2006.
- ⁷⁰ Author's interview with Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, Kyoto, 6 July 2007.
- ⁷¹ Author's Interview with Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Jakarta, 1 December 2006.
- ⁷² The idea of political development stipulated in the Bali Concord II 2003 and the Security Community Plan of Action 2004 was originally coined by Foreign Minister Hasan Wirajuda, who emphasizes the important of sharing values of democracy and human rights. Author's Interview with Hadi Soesastro, 14 December 2006.
- ⁷³ Interview *Suara Pembaharuan's* with Indonesia Foreign Minister Dr. Nur Hasan Wirajuda, *Suara Pembaharuan*, 31 August 2005.
- ⁷⁴ Author's interview with a senior diplomat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 26 November 2006.
- ⁷⁵ "Democracies may go to war against dictatorship, but they rarely fight each other, see Clark. D. Neher and Rose Marlay (1995), *Democracy and Development in Southeast Asia: The Winds of Change*, WestviewPress, p. 2
- ⁷⁶ Author's Interview with Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Jakarta, 1 December 2006.
- ⁷⁷ *ibid.*
- ⁷⁸ The idea of forming an integrated ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) was brought up by Singapore's Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong during the 8th ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, November 2002, where Southeast Asian leaders committed to transforming the region into an AEC by the year 2020. At the summit, Thailand's PM Thaksin and Singapore's PM Goh, the two strongest proponents of an integrated economy, urged ASEAN leaders to speed up economic integration by the year 2015, five years before the current goal of 2020.
- ⁷⁹ *Directorate of Information and Media, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia*, Keynote Speech Transcript of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia Dr. N. Hassan Wirajuda on National Seminar "Membangun Komunitas ASEAN yang Berpusatkan pada Masyarakat" (Building an ASEAN Community: Centered to People), Jakarta, 11 Agustus 2006, <http://www.deplu.go.id/?hotnews_id=1261>, download on August 15, 2006). Also, to address the suggestions of ASEAN members to run an FTA agreement with China, Foreign Minister Wirajuda stated: "Currently there has been imbalance approach of ASEAN members cooperation...in terms that instead of the rise of family feeling, unfair competition has been obvious among ASEAN members...ASEAN members relations have been not healthy", *Kompas* 4 October 2003: *Menu: Saatnya Indonesia Memimpin ASEAN* (Foreign Minister: It's Time for Indonesia to lead ASEAN).
- ⁸⁰ The agreements on an ASEAN-FTA with China, Japan, South Korea, and India have reduced ASEAN cohesiveness and unity to some extent. Ideally ASEAN-FTA plus 3 and India would encourage ASEAN members to be more cohesive and consolidated. In fact, since ASEAN members negotiated with third parties bilaterally rather than multilaterally as one ASEAN, lack of mechanisms and meetings to discuss ASEAN's position as "one ASEAN" weakened ASEAN's togetherness as an important modality to achieve a community. Author's Interview with Hadi Soesastro, Jakarta, 14 December 2006.
- ⁸¹ See Interview *Suara Pembaharuan* with Indonesia Foreign Minister Dr. Nur Hasan Wirajuda, "Membumikan ASEAN yang Demokratis" (To Bring A Democratic ASEAN Down to the Earth), 31 August 2005.

⁸² Referring to the EU experience, the EU has been very strict to common values, as we can see that the EU has not welcomed countries with different political systems (e.g. Communist) as a member.

⁸³ Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, "Looking for Common Values, a Community Driven ASEAN", *The Jakarta Post*, 9 August 2004.

⁸⁴ The idea of "political development" stipulated in the Bali concord II 2003 and the Security Community Plan of Action 2004, originally coined by Foreign Minister Hasan Wirajuda, emphasized the importance of sharing values of democracy and human rights. Author's Interview with Rizal Sukma, on 14 December 2006.

⁸⁵ Translated by author. Interview *Suara Pembaharuan* with Indonesia Foreign Minister Dr. Nur Hasan Wirajuda, *Suara Pembaharuan*, 31 August 2005.

⁸⁶ Author's Interview with Rizal Sukma, *ibid.*

⁸⁷ Author's Interviews with Ikrar Nusha Bhakti and Hadi Soesastro, *ibid.*

⁸⁸ Author's Interviews with Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Hadi Soesastro, *ibid.*

Abstract

This study analyses the reasons behind the idea ASEAN Security community (ASC). This study adopts a "multi-level" approach which argues that the rationales of the development toward the ASC are the outcome of interplay between the global strategic environment, regional political dynamics, and individual ASEAN members' strategies. The findings are as follows: First, the content of the ASEAN Security Community has reflected ideas borrowed from the field of global politics, namely democracy and human rights; Second, the ASC has been responding to regional demands by handling the so-called Non-Traditional Security (NTS) which surfaced after the financial crisis, recovering ASEAN credibility and relevance, and fulfilling the need for a regional security roadmap. Finally, the ASC is inseparable from Indonesia's initiative and motivation to apply a so-called "back to basics" foreign policy, and has been linked with Indonesia's effort to make its foreign policy coherent with domestic dynamics as part of "democratization," its intent to preserve the 'unity' of ASEAN.

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