



**KEPUTUSAN KOREA UTARA KELUAR DARI
SIX PARTY TALKS TAHUN 2009**

**(NORTH KOREA'S DECISION WITHDREW FROM SIX PARTY
TALKS 2009)**

SKRIPSI

diajukan guna melengkapi tugas akhir dan memenuhi salah satu syarat untuk menyelesaikan
Program Studi Hubungan Internasional (S1) dan mencapai gelar Sarjana Sosial

oleh

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2012

PERSEMBAHAN

Dengan Mengucap Syukur kepada Allah SWT dan Surat Al-fatehah, karya sederhana ini aku persembahkan untuk:

1. Kedua orang tuaku tercinta dan adik yang ku sayangi
2. Kepada Almamaterku, Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Politik Universitas Jember

MOTTO

*Waktu memang tidak terbatas,
tetapi waktu kita terbatas.¹*

(Filsafat)

Seorang ahli strategi harus mampu mengubah metode dan jadwalnya, agar tidak ada yang tahu maksudnya.²

(Sun Tzu – Pakar Strategi Perang Klasik China).

¹ Kompas. 2010. Filsafat. <http://filsafat.kompasiana.com/2010/05/07/waktu-memang-tak-terbatas-tapi-waktu-kita-terbatas/>. [12 September 2012]

² Sun Tzu - The Art of War. <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/678141/posts>. [12 September 2012]

PERNYATAAN

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Menyatakan dengan sesungguhnya bahwa karya tulis ilmiah yang berjudul “Keputusan Korea Utara Keluar dari Six Party Talks Tahun 2009 (*North Korea’s Decision Withdraw From Six Party Talks 2009*)” ini benar-benar merupakan hasil karya sendiri, kecuali jika disebutkan sumbernya, serta belum diajukan pada institusi manapun. Karya ini juga bukan merupakan hasil plagiasi. Saya bertanggung jawab atas keabsahan dan kebenaran isinya, sesuai dengan sikap ilmiah yang harus dijunjung tinggi.

Demikian pernyataan ini saya buat dengan sesungguhnya, tanpa ada tekanan atau paksaan dari pihak manapun serta bersedia mendapatkan sanksi akademik jika ternyata di kemudian hari pernyataan ini tidak benar.

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RINGKASAN

Keputusan Korea Utara Keluar dari Six Party Talks; Muhammad Amirul Khotib; 070910101090; 2012; 80 + xv halaman; Jurusan Hubungan Internasional Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik Universitas Jember.

Korea Utara bergabung dalam *Six Party Talks* Agustus Tahun 2003. Perundingan ini dibentuk oleh Amerika Serikat dengan mengikuti sertakan Cina, Rusia, Korea Selatan dan Jepang. Perundingan ini dibentuk dengan tujuan untuk menghentikan pengembangan senjata nuklir Korea Utara ditukan dengan bantuan bahan pangan, energi dan jaminan keamanan dari negara anggota *Six Party talks*. Namun sampai pada tahun 2008, Korea Utara masih belum menghentikan pengayaan nuklir di Yongbyon sebagaimana yang telah disepakati pada tahun 2007 dengan imbalan bantuan minyak mentah dan bahan pangan dari negara anggota *Six Party Talks*. Dengan adanya permasalahan tersebut Amerika Serikat menuduh Korea Utara telah menjual senjata ke teroris sehingga menimbulkan ketegangan dalam forum *Six Party Talks*. Korea utara sebagai negara yang selalu menjadi sasaran Amerika Serikat dalam setiap permasalahan Nuklir dan Keamanan Asia Timur. Untuk memperjelas ketegangan dengan anggota *Six Party Talks* dan mendapatkan apa yang menjadi keinginan Korea Utara serta mempercanggih teknologi Komunikasi maka Pada 05 April 2009 korea Utara meluncurkan roket luar angkas untuk menempatkan satelit ke orbit. Atas peluncuran roket tersebut para anggota *Six Party Talks* menjadi tegang dan melaporkan kejadian tersebut ke DK-PBB bahwa Korea Utara telah melakukan uji coba rudal nuklir. Dengan adanya laporan tersebut, pada hari itu juga DK-PBB megadakan rapat darurat dan sampai pada 13 April 2009 rapat tersebut masih belum ada keputusan sehingga DK-PBB menetapka suara bulat dengan memperketat sanksi resolusi DK-PBB No. 1718 yang dikeluarkan pada tahu 2006 dan mendapat embargo dari Amerika Serikat. Dengan adanya keputusan tersebut Korea Utara merasa tersedak dan keamanan nasional menjadi terancam sehingga Korea Utara menyatakan keluar dari *Six Party Talks* dan akan mengaktifkan kembali pengayaan nuklir di Yongbyon dan tidak mau terikat dengan perjanjian apapun.

PRAKATA

Puji syukur saya haturkan ke hadirat Allah SWT, dengan rahmat dan bimbingan-NYA akhirnya penulis dapat menyusun karya tulis dengan judul "Keputusan Korea Utara Keluar dari Six Party Talks" dan menyelesaiannya dengan baik. Karya tulis ini merupakan syarat untuk memperoleh gelar Strata satu (S1) pada Jurusan Ilmu Hubungan Internasional, Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, Universitas Jember.


Penulis ingin menyampaikan ucapan terima kasih kepada semua pihak yang telah membantu tersusunnya karya tulis ini, kepada:

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Karya sederhana ini belum sempurna sehingga penulis membuka diri terhadap teliti dan koreksi. Semoga tulisan ini dapat bermanfaat bagi kemajuan bangsa, khususnya Ilmu Hubungan Internasional yang selalu penulis banggakan.

Jember, 19 Oktober 2012

Penulis



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
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DAFTAR SINGKATAN

SPT	: <i>Six Party Talks</i>
NPT	: <i>Non-Proliferation Treaty</i>
IAEA	: <i>International Atomic Energy Agency</i>
KWP	: <i>Korean Workers Party</i>
UNSC	: <i>United Nations Security Council</i>
DK-PBB	: Dewan Keamanan Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa
AF	: <i>Agreed framework</i>
HFO	: <i>Heavy Fuel Oil</i>



Security Council

Distr.: General
14 October 2006

Resolution 1718 (2006)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 5551st meeting, on
14 October 2006**

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1540 (2004) and, in particular, resolution 1695 (2006), as well as the statement of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41),

Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Expressing the gravest concern at the claim by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) that it has conducted a test of a nuclear weapon on 9 October 2006, and at the challenge such a test constitutes to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the danger it poses to peace and stability in the region and beyond,

Expressing its firm conviction that the international regime on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be maintained and recalling that the DPRK cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon state in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Deplored the DPRK's announcement of withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its pursuit of nuclear weapons,

Deplored further that the DPRK has refused to return to the Six-Party talks without precondition,

Endorsed the Joint Statement issued on 19 September 2005 by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States,

Underlined the importance that the DPRK respond to other security and humanitarian concerns of the international community,

Expressed profound concern that the test claimed by the DPRK has generated increased tension in the region and beyond, and *determined* therefore that there is a clear threat to international peace and security,



Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,

1. *Condemns* the nuclear test proclaimed by the DPRK on 9 October 2006 in flagrant disregard of its relevant resolutions, in particular resolution 1695 (2006), as well as of the statement of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), including that such a test would bring universal condemnation of the international community and would represent a clear threat to international peace and security;

2. *Demands* that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile;

3. *Demands* that the DPRK immediately retract its announcement of withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

4. *Demands* further that the DPRK return to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, and *underlines* the need for all States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to continue to comply with their Treaty obligations;

5. *Decides* that the DPRK shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launching;

6. *Decides* that the DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, shall act strictly in accordance with the obligations applicable to parties under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the terms and conditions of its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Agreement (IAEA INFCIRC/403) and shall provide the IAEA transparency measures extending beyond these requirements, including such access to individuals, documentation, equipments and facilities as may be required and deemed necessary by the IAEA;

7. *Decides* also that the DPRK shall abandon all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programme in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner;

8. *Decides* that:

(a) All Member States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of:

(i) Any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms, or related materiel including spare parts, or items as determined by the Security Council or the Committee established by paragraph 12 below (the Committee);

(ii) All items, materials, equipment, goods and technology as set out in the lists in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815, unless within 14 days of adoption of this resolution the Committee has amended or completed their provisions also taking into account the list in document S/2006/816, as well as other items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, determined by the

Security Council or the Committee, which could contribute to DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes;

(iii) Luxury goods;

(b) The DPRK shall cease the export of all items covered in subparagraphs (a) (i) and (a) (ii) above and that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flagged vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK;

(c) All Member States shall prevent any transfers to the DPRK by their nationals or from their territories, or from the DPRK by its nationals or from its territory, of technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the items in subparagraphs (a) (i) and (a) (ii) above;

(d) All Member States shall, in accordance with their respective legal processes, freeze immediately the funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories at the date of the adoption of this resolution or at any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the persons or entities designated by the Committee or by the Security Council as being engaged in or providing support for, including through other illicit means, DPRK's nuclear-related, other weapons of mass destruction-related and ballistic missile-related programmes, or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any persons or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of such persons or entities;

(e) All Member States shall take the necessary steps to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated by the Committee or by the Security Council as being responsible for, including through supporting or promoting, DPRK policies in relation to the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related and other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes, together with their family members, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a state to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory;

(f) In order to ensure compliance with the requirements of this paragraph, and thereby preventing illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means of delivery and related materials, all Member States are called upon to take, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, cooperative action including through inspection of cargo to and from the DPRK, as necessary;

9. *Decides* that the provisions of paragraph 8 (d) above do not apply to financial or other assets or resources that have been determined by relevant States:

(a) To be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges, or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services, or fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assets and economic resources, after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention

to authorize, where appropriate, access to such funds, other financial assets and economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of such notification;

(b) To be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee and has been approved by the Committee; or

(c) To be subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgement, in which case the funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgement provided that the lien or judgement was entered prior to the date of the present resolution, is not for the benefit of a person referred to in paragraph 8 (d) above or an individual or entity identified by the Security Council or the Committee, and has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee;

10. *Decides* that the measures imposed by paragraph 8 (e) above shall not apply where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or where the Committee concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of the present resolution;

11. *Calls upon* all Member States to report to the Security Council within thirty days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively the provisions of paragraph 8 above;

12. *Decides* to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks:

(a) To seek from all States, in particular those producing or possessing the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology referred to in paragraph 8 (a) above, information regarding the actions taken by them to implement effectively the measures imposed by paragraph 8 above of this resolution and whatever further information it may consider useful in this regard;

(b) To examine and take appropriate action on information regarding alleged violations of measures imposed by paragraph 8 of this resolution;

(c) To consider and decide upon requests for exemptions set out in paragraphs 9 and 10 above;

(d) To determine additional items, materials, equipment, goods and technology to be specified for the purpose of paragraphs 8 (a) (i) and 8 (a) (ii) above;

(e) To designate additional individuals and entities subject to the measures imposed by paragraphs 8 (d) and 8 (e) above;

(f) To promulgate guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed by this resolution;

(g) To report at least every 90 days to the Security Council on its work, with its observations and recommendations, in particular on ways to strengthen the effectiveness of the measures imposed by paragraph 8 above;

13. *Welcomes and encourages further* the efforts by all States concerned to intensify their diplomatic efforts, to refrain from any actions that might aggravate

tension and to facilitate the early resumption of the Six-Party Talks, with a view to the expeditious implementation of the Joint Statement issued on 19 September 2005 by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States, to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia;

14. *Calls upon* the DPRK to return immediately to the Six-Party Talks without precondition and to work towards the expeditious implementation of the Joint Statement issued on 19 September 2005 by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States;

15. *Affirms* that it shall keep DPRK's actions under continuous review and that it shall be prepared to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in paragraph 8 above, including the strengthening, modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed at that time in light of the DPRK's compliance with the provisions of the resolution;

16. *Underlines* that further decisions will be required, should additional measures be necessary;

17. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.