Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://repository.unej.ac.id/xmlui/handle/123456789/58828
Title: Kepentingan Nicolas Sarkozy Dalam Pembuatan Kebijakan Imigrasi di Perancis
Authors: Putri Jazilah, Fudzcha
Susilo, Djoko
Dwi Eriyanti, Linda
Keywords: Immigration
political actors
Rational Choice
Self- Interest
Issue Date: 2012
Publisher: UNEJ
Series/Report no.: Artikel Ilmiah Hasil Penelitian Mahasiswa;
Abstract: Waves of immigration in France is an important aspect of contemporary French history . At first, the immigrants who came were originally from neighboring countries within Europe, but they also came from countries in Africa and Asia which most are former French colony before World War II. Immigrants from Africa, especially North Africa have their own problems in France because they have very different backgrounds with the native French. The differences are based on economic background, religion and physical appearance. Those differences become a problem for the French because it is so difficult to blend the differences and make an assimilation. In the end, conflicts began to occur between the immigrants and the native . The largest conflict in 2005 was one of the evidence which show that there was a misunderstanding between the immigrants and the natives. On that matter, Nicolas Sarkozy as the domestic minister initiated a policy namely France Immigration and Integration Law which aim to sort out immigrants who deserve to enter the territory of France. However, what is interesting is that the personal interest Nicolas Sarkozy brought in the policy making which is his desire to raise support for his party and himself when he run for presidential election of France in 2007. Thus, the writer use the Rational Choice Theory to analyze more deeply the related problem . Rational Choice Theory assumes that political actors will only take actions when rational considerations has been made,along with the consideration of cost and benefit whether what he will get equivalent sacrifice his expectation in a established incentive political structure.
URI: http://repository.unej.ac.id/handle/123456789/58828
Appears in Collections:SRA-Social And Politic

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